Learning objectives
The overarching goal of this course is to introduce and assess the issue of indeterminacy in the world, aka metaphysical indeterminacy, a topic which was dismissed throughout the 20th century, but which has become the object of intense study over the last two decades. I will start by introducing the distinction between representational and metaphysical indeterminacy, as well as offering reasons that have been given both in favor and against the possibility of metaphysical indeterminacy by critically overviewing and discussing the relevant philosophical literature. The central part of the course will lay out in detail the main proposals that have been developed for modeling metaphysical indeterminacy. The third, and last part will address the logic of metaphysical indeterminacy, as well as a number of open problems, such as the wider role metaphysical indeterminacy plays across philosophy and the sciences.
Prerequisites
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Course unit content
INDETERMINACY IN THE WORLD
The way we represent the world in thought and language is shot through with indeterminacy: we speak of heaps of sand and red apples, without thereby committing to any specific number of grains to constitute a heap or to any precise boundary between red and orange. Such phenomena famously lead to paradox. Philosophers have acknowledged and digested the existence of representational indeterminacy, and captured it by appealing to a number of strategies that can be either semantic, logical, or epistemological in character.
But can reality itself be indeterminate? In other words, can indeterminacy originate in the world, as well as in our representations? If so, how should we model the phenomenon of worldly, aka metaphysical indeterminacy? Those are the main questions that will be address in this course.
Ma può la realtà stessa essere indeterminata? In altre parole, l'indeterminatezza può avere origine nel mondo, oltre che nelle nostre rappresentazioni? In tal caso, come dovremmo modellare il fenomeno dell'indeterminatezza nel mondo, ovvero metafisica? Queste sono le principali domande che verranno affrontate in questo corso.
Full programme
SEMANTIC INDETERMINACY
Session 1: Indeterminacy in language.
Readings: Keefe (2000), ch. 1.
Session 2: Supervaluationism.
Readings: Keefe (2000), ch. 7.
IDENTITY
Session 3: Indeterminate identity I.
Readings: Evans (1978).
Session 4: Indeterminate identity II.
Readings: Williams (2008).
Session 5: Indeterminate identity III.
Readings: Akiba (2000).
Session 6: The problem of the many.
Readings: Lewis (1993).
THEORIES OF METAPHYSICAL INDETERMINACY
Session 7: Metaphysical indeterminacy as de re indeterminacy.
Readings: Williamson (2003).
Session 8: Metaphysical indeterminacy as ontic unsettledness I.
Readings: Akiba (2004).
Session 9: Metaphysical indeterminacy as ontic unsettledness II.
Readings: Barnes & Williams (2011).
Session 10: Determinable-based metaphysical indeterminacy.
Readings: Wilson (2013).
QUANTUM PHYSICS
Session 11: Quantum indeterminacy I.
Readings: Skow (2010).
Session 12: Quantum indeterminacy II.
Readings: Darby & Pickup (2019).
Session 13: Quantum indeterminacy III.
Readings: Torza (2021).
FUNDAMENTAL INDETERMINACY
Session 14: Fundamental indeterminacy.
Readings: Barnes (2014).
Session 15: Indeterminate naturalness.
Readings: Sud (2018).
Bibliography
Akiba, Ken (2000). Vagueness as a modality. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):359-370.
Akiba, Ken (2004). Vagueness in the world. Noûs 38 (3):407–429.
Barnes, Elizabeth (2014). Fundamental Indeterminacy. Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):339-362.
Barnes, Elizabeth & Williams, J. Robert G. (2011). A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy. In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol 6. Oxford University Press.
Darby, George & Pickup, Martin (2019). Modelling Deep Indeterminacy. Synthese: 1-26.
Evans, Gareth (1978). Can there be vague objects? Analysis 38 (4):208.
Keefe, Rosanna (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press: ch. 1, 7.
Lewis, David K. (1993). Many, but almost one. In Keith Cambell, John Bacon & Lloyd Reinhardt (eds.), Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press.
Skow, Bradford (2010). Deep metaphysical indeterminacy. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):851 - 858.
Sud, Rohan (2018). Vague Naturalness as Ersatz Metaphysical Vagueness. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol 11.
Torza (2021). Quantum metametaphysics. Synthese.
Williams, Robert (2008). Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):134-154.
Williamson, Timothy (2003). Vagueness in reality. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Wilson, Jessica M. (2013). A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):359-385.
Teaching methods
The course will take place over 15 sessions of 2 hours, each of them on a particular subtopic. In order to introduce and motivate the problem, a general introduction to the issue of indeterminacy will be provided in the first two sessions. Starting with the third session, the course will delve into the core questions, namely: what is metaphysical indeterminacy? Is it possible/coherent? If so, how are we supposed to model it? The course will wrap up with a number of sessions about the relevance of metaphysical indeterminacy to our understanding of fundamental physics. All of the questions being discussed will be addressed by relying on primary literature by some of the internationally leading figures in the debate.
The class will be offered in English. Students who struggle with the English language should feel free to approach the professor, in such a way that they can obtain additional bibliography in Italian and/or discuss the main topics on a one-to-one basis.
Assessment methods and criteria
The assessment is based on ascertaining the student's ability to correctly understand and present the main issues dealt with during the course, both from a historical and critical point of view, identifying any problematic aspects of the positions dealt with. The exam is therefore an opportunity for dialogue to also support one's own points of view (descriptor 5).
Grading:
30 cum laude: excellent, solid knowledge, excellent expressive skills, complete understanding of concepts and topics.
30: very good, complete and adequate knowledge, ability to express and reason correctly.
27-29: good, satisfactory knowledge, ability of expression and essentially correct argument.
24-26: fairly good knowledge, but incomplete and not always correct.
21-23: generally good but superficial knowledge. Often inappropriate expression.
18-21: sufficient; elementary knowledge of the proposed themes, reduced expressive skills.
Less than 18: insufficient. The student did not acquire the knowledge and did not develop the required skills even in an elementary way.
Other information
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